Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

2012

Originalist Ideology and the Rule of Law
Ian C. Bartrum
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Bartrum, Ian C., "Originalist Ideology and the Rule of Law" (2012). Scholarly Works. 699.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/699

This Article is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository administered
by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact
youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

BARTRUM.06.MACRO.DOC

9/12/2012 9:09 PM

ORIGINALIST IDEOLOGY AND THE RULE OF LAW
Ian Bartrum

*

In July of 1985 Attorney General Edwin Meese addressed the national convention of the American Bar Association with hopes of in1
spiring a fundamental change in constitutional interpretation. He
railed against the Supreme Court’s unprincipled turn towards a “jurisprudence of idiosyncrasy,” lamented recent decisions as “more policy choices than articulations of constitutional principle,” and called
urgently on the Justices to adopt “a coherent jurisprudential stance”
2
lest a “constitution in the true sense” cease to exist. Meese had a
particular stance in mind, and, to no one’s surprise, it was not a re3
turn to the Warren Court’s brand of “radical egalitarianism.” Rather, he claimed that the only interpretive theory adequate to protect
our democratic institutions and the rule of law is “a jurisprudence of
4
original intention.” Of course, most such attempts to initiate broad
interpretive change have fairly limited effect, but Meese’s speech
seemed to engage an idea whose time had come, and, in retrospect, it
helped bring about something of a sea change in constitutional
theory. To wit, Justice Antonin Scalia recently reflected that, unlike
circumstances at the time of his appointment, “[o]riginalism is [now]
5
in the game, even if it does not always prevail.” And, a little over a
decade after Meese’s speech, Laurence Tribe would summarize some
of Ronald Dworkin’s thoughts with what has become a contemporary
6
ubiquity: “We are all originalists now.”

*
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Associate Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV. Many thanks to Sean Wilson,
whose fundamental insights about language and meaning deeply inform this paper. Any
misunderstandings or misapplications of those insights are entirely my own.
See Edwin Meese III, Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), reprinted
in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 47 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007).
Id. at 50, 52-53.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Antonin Scalia, Foreword to ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 43, 44 (Steven
G. Calabresi ed., 2007).
Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 65, 67
(1997).

1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2155207
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While Meese certainly did not invent originalism, his speech undoubtedly helped revive an approach that had fallen into some disuse. Perhaps nowhere is this resurgence more evident than in the legal academy, where Meese contemporaries like Raoul Berger and
Robert Bork have passed the torch to a younger generation of “New
Originalists,” who have abandoned the archaeology of “original intentions” and now search for various forms of “original public mean7
ing.” This “new” originalism concedes that intentions are not meaning, and recognizes that, to the extent history should inform constituconstitutional interpretation, the relevant moment is ratification and
8
not drafting. Contemporary originalists have also generally come to
accept that constitutional language may be underdetermined, and
thus concede that modern interpreters will sometimes need to “construct” legal rules in ways that rely on “something other than original
9
meaning.” Nonetheless, most modern originalists believe that original meaning must contribute something quite substantial to constitu10
tional interpretation. Indeed, Larry Solum—perhaps the most inclusive of the New Originalists—has argued that almost all originalists
share two essential commitments: (1) the fixation thesis, which claims
that constitutional meaning is “fixed” or “frozen” at a particular moment in time; and (2) a reasonably strong version of the contribution
thesis, which holds that, absent weighty reasons, this fixed meaning
11
must “constrain” modern interpretive decisions.
In earlier work, I have attacked the first of these commitments,
and I continue to believe that with ordinary language usage—
particularly vague usage—meaning is not the sort of thing that can be

7

8

9
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11

See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism
(Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers Series, No. 07-24, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244; RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning
and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427 (2007); John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 371 (2007).
See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 7, at 59 (recognizing that “[t]he goal of interpreting
meaning is not to penetrate into some alien mind”); Lawrence B. Solum, What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory 10 (April 28, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1825543 (claiming that scholarly consensus came to recognize
that “the original intentions of the Framers could not serve as the basis for a viable theory
of constitutional interpretation and construction”).
Solum, What is Originalism?, supra note 8, at 16.
See Solum, What is Originalism?, supra note 8, at 32.
Solum, What is Originalism?, supra note 8, at 34.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2155207
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12

“fixed.” And the Constitution is quite decidedly an ordinary lan13
guage document. In this essay, however, I turn my attention to the
second originalist commitment—the so-called “contribution thesis.”
Assuming here that constitutional meaning could be fixed in time, I
contend that, Ed Meese notwithstanding, it is actually the contribution thesis—at least in its strong forms—that compromises the rule of
law. Originalism of this type would have “historical understandings”
14
displace the judiciary as the principal expositor of legal meanings.
One of the core features of the American conception of the rule of
law is that it is the law—not the lawgiver or her intentions—that obligates us, and, when the text is vague, an institutionalized judiciary is
authorized to act as its interpreter. The interposition of a binding
historical exegetist between the text and the judge thus compromises
the basic structural commitments of American democracy. We
should therefore understand this sort of originalism as a political ideol15
ogy and not a theory of the Constitution as it exists.
VAGUENESS AND THE RULE OF LAW
Quarrels about textual meaning rarely arise over determinate constitutional provisions like the Presidential age requirement. In such
cases, the relevant linguistic rules are suitably precise and our practices well enough settled that the law essentially speaks for itself. It is
rather the underdetermined or vague constitutional language that
gives us trouble, exactly because the underlying rules and practices
governing its meaning are themselves imprecise and controversial.
12

13

14
15

See Ian Bartrum, Constructing the Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic Evolution of Federalist
10, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 11-12 (2010). The basic point is that no foundational referent—no external, verifiable object—exists to which vague language can be “fixed.” Such
words do not get their meaning by naming objects, but from proper usage according to
underdetermined linguistic conventions or rules.
See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 43, 84-85 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958). Despite efforts to the contrary, we cannot liken these underdetermined rules to “linguistic
facts,” which might become the basis of a “fixed” meaning. But see Lawrence B. Solum, A
Reader’s Guide to Semantic Originalism and a Reply to Professor Griffin 13 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers Series, No. 08-12, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1130665 (“But when we disagree about [the linguistic meaning or semantic content of the Constitution] we are disagreeing about linguistic facts. In principle, there is a
fact of the matter about what the linguistic content is.”).
Specialized or technical language usages rely on either an expert language community or
the stipulation of definitions and/or applications. The Constitution was, of course, submitted to “the People,” and contains little in the way of stipulated definitions.
For an enlightening discussion of this problem, see SEAN WILSON, THE FLEXIBLE
CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2012) (on file with author).
This fundamental insight here is Sean Wilson’s. See id. at 149-50. I hope here only to
think through some of its implications for constitutional culture and the rule of law.
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Logically speaking, the problem is straightforward: a vague proposi16
tion may have no determinate truth-value. Whether it is true, for
example, that a particular kind of legal protection is “equal” to
another depends upon how we measure equality, and it may be the
case that two perfectly reasonable kinds of measurement yield contradictory results. And with ordinary language such as the Constitution, we cannot, as David Lewis says, “pick a delineation once and for
all . . . but must consider the entire range of reasonable delinea17
tions.” Thus, unlike the Presidential Age Clause, the Equal Protection Clause cannot speak for itself, and so requires an interpreter. In
our legal tradition, that job lies with the judge, who may consider and
adopt any reasonable measurement to decide a given case. Originalist ideology, however, makes “historical understanding” superior to
the judge, and would thus confine “equal” to reasonable historical
measurements. This, I contend, is at odds with well-accepted ideas
about of the rule of law.
Without a working account of the “rule of law,” of course, this final assertion only begs the question, and so to better define the con18
cept I turn to Brian Tamanaha’s thoughtful descriptive efforts. In a
recent lecture, Tamanaha summarized some of his earlier work with a
“thin” definition—“[t]he rule of law means that government officials
and citizens are bound by and abide by the law”—which he fleshed
out with three core “themes” or “notions” of usage and practice: (1)
“government is limited by law”; (2) “formal legality”; and (3) “[t]he
19
rule of law, not man.”
The American embodiment of the first
theme is a semi-independent prosecuting branch and a structural di16

17
18

19

The late and eminent David Lewis summarized the issue well:
If Fred is a borderline case of baldness, the sentence “Fred is bald” may have no
determinate truth value. Whether it is true depends on where you draw the line.
Relative to some perfectly reasonable ways of drawing a precise boundary between
bald and not-bald, the sentence is true. Relative to other delineations, no less reasonable, it is false. Nothing in our use of language makes one of these delineations right and all the others wrong. We cannot pick a delineation once and for
all (not if we are interested in ordinary language), but must consider the entire
range of reasonable delineations.
DAVID LEWIS, Scorekeeping in a Language Game, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 233, 244
(1983).
Id. “Reasonable” here points toward the accepted practical usage conventions, which
may, again, be underdetermined.
See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY (2004);
Brian Z. Tamanaha, The History and Elements of the Rule of Law, (Washington Univ. in St.
Louis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 12-02-07, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2012845.
Tamanaha, History and Elements, supra note 18, at 2, 3 & 8. Tamanaha considers each of
these themes in a great deal more depth in his book on the subject. See TAMANAHA, ON
THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 18, at 114-26.
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vision of government that gives “the judiciary the capacity to hold the
20
other parts answerable on legal grounds.” The second theme promotes predictability by demanding that laws be published in advance,
not “demand the impossible,” and be generally applicable “according
21
to their terms.” The third theme requires that neutral principles
must supersede individual caprice, enforcement of which, in the
American model, remains “the special preserve of judges” who must
22
be “unbiased” and “loyal to the law alone.” These three core themes
provide a useful framework against which we can assess and explore
my claim that originalist ideology subverts the rule of law.
I will consider the second theme—“formal legality”—first; both
because it underpins the other themes, and because it is in assessing
this notion that the fundamental problem with originalism becomes
most clear. Leaving aside the problem of laws that demand the im23
possible, formal legality requires that the laws be set forth in advance and bind all according to their published terms. These requirements ensure that the laws are predictable and provide notice to
all. Originalist interpretive ideologies, however, compromise both
these guiding principles and their purposes. Indeed, in many cases,
originalism does not treat the prior published text as law at all. Rather, the
published text and terms act only as a placeholder for some set of “historical understandings,” which in fact contain the relevant legal con24
tent. As a crude illustration, imagine a Yellow Pages entry that simply refers the user to a different location: “Cinemas: See Theaters.” In
the context of originalist ideology this might become, “Cruel and
Unusual Punishment: See Penal Codes, 1789.” Under such a theory,
we bar those younger than 35 from the Presidency based on the public meaning of “the Age of thirty five Years” in 1789—not because
there is broad agreement on that phrase’s public meaning today. For
originalists, then, the Constitution’s published terms are not actually
the law, which is instead hidden in a set of extra-legal historical norms
25
and conceptions. This compromises both the law’s “formal” charac20
21
22
23

24

25

Tamanaha, History and Elements, supra note 18, at 14.
Tamanaha, History and Elements, supra note 18, at 15.
Tamanaha, History and Elements, supra note 18, at 22.
In this context, however, it is interesting to think about recent “positive right” constitutions—such as South Africa’s—that may ask their governments to meet impossible demands.
Sean Wilson has argued that such a view treats the text as a “gesture,” or something akin
to a religious sacrament, in which meaning lies somewhere beyond the actual utterance.
WILSON, supra note 14, at 35-36.
Ronald Dworkin has famously made the distinction between a concept and its conceptions:
Suppose I tell my children simply that I expect them not to treat others unfairly. I
no doubt have in mind examples of the conduct I mean to discourage, but I would
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ter and the goals of notice and predictability, and thus subverts the
rule of law as we understand that idea.
So what are we to do with vague constitutional language, which
seems to be somewhat unpredictable all by itself? The answer is simple, if unsatisfying to some. Formal legality requires us to treat vague
published language as the law, even if it is less predictable than other,
more determinate provisions. It must be the published terms themselves—not some hidden set of historical conceptions—which bind us
moving forward. In a government dedicated to the rule of law, the
lawmaker who hopes to bind future generations to specific or determinate legal conceptions must make those conceptions explicit in the
enacted text. There is a difference, in other words, between declaring that the President must be “mature” and requiring that he “have
attained to the Age of thirty five Years,” and formal legality requires
us to recognize the law in the particular form that it appears. When
that form is vague or underdetermined, we must accept that the law
leaves questions of specific application or conception to its designated interpreter, which brings us to the other two themes underlying
the rule of law.
Tamanaha’s remaining themes—“government limited by law” and
“rule of law, not man”—speak to related ideas about the function and
limits of the judiciary under the rule of law. Our constitutional structure works to ensure that law limits the government by dividing authority among several branches, and by empowering the judicial
branch to hold the legislative and executive branches to account. As
Tamanaha says, this architecture makes the interpretation and application of law “the special preserve of judges,” and I suggest that efforts to divest the judiciary of this authority—or to constrain it in the
service of extra-legal policy preferences—compromise the structural
means by which we have sought to limit government by law. Indeed,
Miguel Schor has observed that a weakened, politicized judiciary is
among the “key features of . . . the un-rule of law” in developing na26
tions. And this is exactly the danger of an interpretive ideology that
makes judicial interpretation subservient to “historical understand-

26

not accept that my ‘meaning’ was limited to these examples . . . . I might say that I
meant the family to be guided by the concept of fairness, not by any specific conception of fairness I might have had in mind.
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134 (1977).
Miguel Schor, Rule of Law, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES 1329, 1330 (David S. Clark ed., 2007). Along these same lines, David
Strauss has recently argued that originalism compromises the candor and Burkean legitimacy inherent in our longstanding common law tradition. See DAVID STRAUSS, THE
LIVING CONSTITUTION 43-46 (2010).
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ings,” which in turn promote the conceptual preferences of a past
culture. Thus, originalist ideologies, at least those that depend upon
strong versions of the contribution thesis, not only violate the principle of formal legality, they also subvert our efforts to limit government by law. It is for these reasons that I contend that originalism is
inconsistent with the rule of law, and suggest that we must leave
judges free to engage all reasonable interpretive strategies in fulfilling their constitutional role.
Of course, entrusting judges with such broad authority presents its
own substantial risks to the rule of law, particularly when courts are
called upon to interpret vague constitutional language in concrete
cases. There is the danger, as Tamanaha points out, “that the rule of
law might become rule by judges”; that is, if the courts cannot remain
politically neutral and “loyal to the law alone,” we might just as easily
find ourselves subject to the arbitrary whim of a judge as of any other
27
man. Indeed, it is precisely this danger that has led Ed Meese and
others to endorse the binding constraint of originalist ideology. But,
as I have demonstrated above, this kind of extra-legal constraint is inconsistent with other broadly accepted notions about the rule of law,
and so it cannot provide the sort of remedy that originalists are seeking. This is not to say that judges are, or should be, completely unconstrained in their decision-making. Rather, they must operate
within the accepted norms governing constitutional interpretive prac28
tice. Historical arguments are certainly an important part of that
practice, but, in keeping with the rule of law, we cannot treat them as
the only permissible—or even the strongly preferred—grounds of judicial
interpretation. If history is to constrain interpretation, it must be because the judge so decides in a particular case, not because the contribution thesis—or any external normative theory—categorically
commands it.
BEYOND THE DEAD HAND PROBLEM
This objection to originalism—call it the “legality objection” for
short—is both more and less than the so-called (and much rehearsed) “dead hand problem,” and explaining why may help clarify
my claim. The claim is more because, while “dead hand” theories
generally suggest that originalism results in undemocratic applica27
28

Tamanaha, History and Elements, supra note 18, at 22 & 24 (emphasis in original).
Philip Bobbitt has provided an excellent account of these norms as “modalities” of constitutional argument. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1982).
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tions of law, the “legality objection” contends that binding original29
ism does not treat the Constitution as law at all. The claim is less because
I do not suggest that the “dead hand” of the past cannot bind us in
democratically legitimate ways—this is, after all, an essential feature
of law’s authority—but, rather, that it must do so through the text and
not by resort to extra-legal historical norms.
To explore these distinctions in more depth, we need a working
account of the “dead hand” problem, and Reva Siegel has offered as
good a summary as any:
It has been hundreds of years since the Constitution was ratified. No one
alive today participated in the ratification process. The cumbersome supermajority rules of Article V make amending the Constitution so much
more difficult than other forms of legislative change that, since ratification of the Bill of Rights, the Constitution has been amended less than
twenty times. The living have not assented to Article V as the sole method of constitutional change. And if we are to construe the living as
having implicitly consented to any constitutional understanding or arrangement, it is to the Constitution as it is currently interpreted, with its
30
many pathways of change.

The objection is thus to originalism’s democratic legitimacy as an interpretive practice given the (perhaps unintended) insurmountability of
31
Article V’s amendment hurdles.
The difficulty of amendment
makes the Constitution’s normative commitments practically unassailable, and thus largely unaccountable to the American people. In
our political theory and tradition, of course, government derives its
32
“just powers from the consent of the governed,” and so, to preserve
democratic legitimacy, the Supreme Court should provide an Article
V workaround by interpreting the Constitution as a “living” document.
The essential claim here is that the Constitution suffers from a serious and probably permanent design defect: Article V. Notice that if
the Constitution were more easily amended the “dead hand” problem
would largely dissolve, just as Raoul Berger supposed was true back in
1981: “[o]f course the dead cannot bind us; nor did they seek to do

29

30
31

32

Again, at least this much of the “legality objection” derives directly from Sean Wilson’s
work. See WILSON, supra note 14, at 149 (“[I]t makes no sense to set forth a constitution
as ‘the law,’ yet retain some other mysterious entity from the past that controls who wins
or loses the cases, and what the hidden principles are.”).
Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1399, 1404-05 (2009) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
For an interesting take on Article V’s “imbecilic” design, see Sanford Levinson, Our Imbecilic Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2012, http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/05/28/our-imbecilic-constitution.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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so. Instead, the Framers provided us with an instrument of change—
33
amendment pursuant to Article V.” In such a circumstance, presumably, those who rely solely on the “dead hand” objection would
have no problem with a strong version of originalism. For them the
problem with binding originalism is contextual and not categorical. It is
our peculiar, flawed Constitution—not the theory itself—that makes
originalist approaches problematic. In this sense the “legality objection” claims more than the “dead hand problem”; indeed, it is categorical. Even if we could readily modify constitutional terms to suit the
living, the “legality objection” claims that approaches that would bind
us to extra-legal “historical understandings” of the text are always inconsistent with the rule of law.
I have also said that the “legality objection” is less than the “dead
hand problem,” and we are now in a better position to see why. Unlike “dead hand” complaints, the “legality objection” does not claim
that efforts to bind future generations through law pose a threat to
democratic legitimacy. Indeed, as I have said, this is a central feature
of law’s claim to authority: present enactments—if made pursuant to
suitably democratic secondary rules—will impose legitimate future
obligations. In other words, even if the Framers had chosen to omit
Article V entirely, or had expressly made the Constitution unamendable (as in the case of Senate apportionment), the “legality objection”
has no quarrel with past majorities binding present ones—provided
34
they do so explicitly through law. The objection, rather, is to an
ideology that would interpose extra-textual historical understandings
or norms between the modern reader and the law itself. If, for example, the Presidential age requirement were as unpopular today as
is the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment excludes women, presumably “dead hand” theorists would find both rules equally lacking
in democratic legitimacy. Not so the “legality objection,” which holds
that any duly enacted law properly binds future generations to the
plain meaning of its published terms.
CONCLUSION
In the title and throughout this essay I have referred to originalism as an “ideology,” and have suggested that, despite rhetorical recourse to philosophical terms like “speaker’s meaning” and “semantic

33
34

Raoul Berger, Paul Brest’s Brief for an Imperial Judiciary, 40 MD. L. REV. 1, 3 (1981).
Article V, of course, expressly provides “that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.” U.S. CONST. art. V.
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35

content,” it is not an account of how our Constitution has meaning
in a culture dedicated to the rule of law. What I mean by this is that
originalism, by virtue of the contribution thesis, is an organized normative effort to bring about a fundamental change in our existing political structure by making judges subservient to extra-legal constraints that generally advance a particular policy agenda.
I hope I have
demonstrated that this ideology undermines broadly accepted notions about the rule of law, and so—no matter how tempted we are to
bring “unfettered” judicial discretion under greater political control—binding external constraints on legal interpretive practices are
a cure worse than the disease. We must accept that both the rule of
law and our constitutional structure entrust judges with great authority and responsibility, and hope that our legal practices—in courtrooms, boardrooms, and classrooms—can cultivate and maintain an
interpretive culture that honors our most important democratic
ideals.

35

I refer here to the description Larry Solum has offered in his highly influential account of
“semantic originalism.” See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 7, at 34-37 (citing
PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 3-143 (1989)).

